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RAISING THE "CIVILIZED MINIMUM" OF PAIN
AMELIORATION FOR PRISONERS TO AVOID CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
James McGrath*
This Article addresses the problems with our nation's cultural
and legal prohibitions against certain pain management treat-
ments. The practice of pain management has not kept pace with the
many medical advances that have made it possible for physicians to
ameliorate most pain. The Author notes that some patients are de-
nied access to certain forms of treatments due to the mistaken belief
that addiction may ensue. Additionally, some individuals are un-
der-treated for their pain to a greater degree than are others. This is
especially the case for our nation's prisoners. The Author contends
that prisoners are frequently denied effective pain amelioration. He
notes, however, that there has been improvement in medical treat-
ment in general for prisoners due to court challenges based on the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. Yet, due to the protection of qualified immunity given to
jailers and prison health care providers, prisoners cannot bring a
claim for negligence or medical malpractice, they must allege a vio-
lation of their constitutional rights, a significantly higher legal
standard. Prisoners must meet a subjective test showing that there
was a deliberate indifference to their medical needs that violates the
protection of the Eighth Amendment. The Author contends that be-
cause medical advances have made it possible to alleviate most pain
suffering, withholding pain treatment or providing a less effective
treatment is tantamount to inflicting pain and should be viewed as
a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although science has advanced sufficiently to enable physicians
to effectively manage almost all pain through various medicines and
treatments,1 our nation's cultural and legal prohibitions against ef-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law; L.L.M. Temple Uni-
versity School of Law, 2002; J.D. Howard University, 1997; M.P.H. Harvard School of
Public Health, 2000; B.A. San Jose State University, 1994. I am grateful to Rick
Greenstein and Melanie Jacobs for their insightful and extremely helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
1. See RONALD MELZACK & PATRICK D. WALL, THE CHALLENGE OF PAIN 52-56
(1983) (describing different types of pain and recognizing the ability of doctors to treat
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fective pain management keep many people suffering needlessly. De-
spite the availability of effective medications, many physicians have
been unwilling to effectively treat pain for many reasons that some
medical experts are now labeling as irrational.2 Many of the most ef-
fective pain medicines are opium derivatives ("opioid" narcotics) for
which unfounded fears of patient addiction reduce, in some physi-
cians' opinions, their potential benefit in alleviating pain.'
Although pain sufferers are generally under-treated, not all peo-
ple in the United States are under-treated equally for their suffer-
ing.4 People of color, women, and children receive less effective
treatment for pain as compared to Caucasian men.5 Patients with
greater financial resources have greater access to adequate pain re-
lief, as their financial freedom permits them to seek relief from as
many providers as they are willing to pay to see. Those with greater
freedom to choose their treatment options are obviously far more
likely to have their pain treated effectively. Many people without
these economic resources who are denied effective pain ameliorative
treatment may have access to a developing cause of action that would
impose liability for the under-treatment of pain.6 Some legal com-
mentators are advocating for the creation of a tort for failure to ade-
quately treat pain and documenting its development.7
What then of sufferers who have no choice, no freedom whatso-
ever? Prisoners in the United States have access to health care only
through their captors, through an often slow and inefficient sick call
procedure.8 Although the treatment of prisoners generally, and their
medical needs specifically, has improved greatly with the maturing of
our nation, prisoners are often denied effective pain amelioration.9
Nonetheless, the invocation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment has afforded prisoners greater
these pain types).
2. Ben A. Rich, A Prescription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for
Pain Management, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2000).
3. DAVID B. MORRIS, THE CULTURE OF PAIN 192 (1991) ("American doctors regu-
larly refuse to prescribe effective doses of narcotic painkillers to dying patients on the
grounds that the patients might become addicted").
4. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 70-78.
7. Id.
8. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 110-11 n.3 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing HEALTH LAW PROJECT, UNIV. OF PA., Health Care and Conditions in Pennsyl-
vania's State Prisons, in AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON CORR. FACILITIES & SERVS.,
MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE IN JAILS, PRISONS, AND OTHER CORRECTIONAL FACILI-
TIES: A COMPILATION OF STANDARDS AND MATERIALS 71, 81-82 (1974)).
9. See infra Section V.A. (discussing the denial of pain medication to prisoners).
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access to adequate healthcare." As our society's general view of what
constitutes the humane treatment of people has changed, our law
concerning what is cruel and unusual punishment has also evolved."
With this evolution, our treatment of our prisoners has slowly im-
proved, and largely through court challenges."
Prisoners often have no recourse for inadequate or negligent
medical treatment, as their health care providers and jailers are of-
ten protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. 3 This immunity
often shields these state actors against claims of negligence or medi-
cal malpractice. To seek redress for failure to provide adequate medi-
cal care in federal court, prisoners' claims must meet a higher stan-
dard than negligence or malpractice; they must show a deliberate in-
difference to their serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.14
This subjective standard of deliberate indifference is often difficult to
prove, particularly in cases pertaining to inadequate treatment of a
prisoner's pain.
Revelations in the medical and legal literature recognizing the
generally inadequate treatment of pain, as well as medicine's ad-
vanced capacity to relieve suffering, will likely change our nation's
perspective on what is a tolerable amount of pain. When it becomes
common knowledge that almost all pain can be alleviated, there will
be less public tolerance for enduring pain, and permitting patients to
suffer. As intolerance for unnecessary pain becomes the norm, this
unwillingness to permit people to suffer pain must extend to incar-
cerated people.
Many federal claims by prisoners seeking relief or compensation
for their suffering due to a serious medical condition are dismissed on
summary judgment, or for failure to state a cause of action, as their
claims are "merely" of medical malpractice or negligence." To survive
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, a claim must allege delib-
erate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs." This delib-
erate indifference standard, when applied to a prisoner's case using
the current, popular medical standards, is especially difficult to prove
in cases of failure to adequately treat pain. By recognizing the reality
of modern medicine, that almost all pain can be alleviated, it is argu-
able that a failure to treat a prisoner's pain for a serious medical










condition is per se cruel and unusual punishment. Failure to properly
treat pain, when it can be alleviated, is tantamount to a willful inflic-
tion of pain. Withholding pain medication, or as often happens, sub-
stitution of a less effective treatment, should be considered a viola-
tion of a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights.
Before discussing the existing legal standard applied in prisoner
cases, this Article will provide an examination of some recent litera-
ture concerning our nation's cultural and medical approaches to pain.
A review of the law's influence on evolving medical standards follows.
This background information on the nature of pain is important to
understand the implications of legal approaches to this medical issue.
As evidence that society's tolerance for pain is lessening, this Ar-
ticle will then examine the legal arguments that failure of a physi-
cian to adequately treat pain may be actionable in tort. As the doc-
trine of qualified immunity prevents most prisoners from pursuing
tort claims for inadequate medical treatment, this Article will next
review a prisoner's existing rights to adequate medical care. A review
of prisoner cases claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment for inadequate medi-
cal treatment follows, with a special focus on failure to alleviate pain.
The final section of this Article will review the current standard
for evaluating prisoner cases in light of the advanced ability to treat
pain and the decreasing public tolerance for the needless suffering of
pain. When the reality of the principles of modern pain management
are applied, the existing legal standard for litigating Eighth Amend-
ment claims is adequate to establish that a failure to treat a pris-
oner's pain for a serious medical condition is per se cruel and unusual
punishment. Practitioners and prisoners making their claims pro se
should incorporate the literature concerning the new medical reality
of effective pain management in their complaints to reveal that the
existing legal standard is sufficient protection against failure to ap-
propriately minister to a prisoner's pain.
II. THE UNDER-TREATMENT OF PAIN
The fact that people are suffering from pain needlessly is hardly
a new development. For over twenty-five years, the under-treatment
of pain has been well documented in the literature of the health care
professions. 7 Although most pain can be safely treated and relieved, 8
17. See Rich, supra note 2, at 8. Professor Rich discusses a 1973 article document-
ing physicians' unwillingness to treat pain effectively with narcotics because of exces-
sive fear about the danger of addiction, noting they had significant misunderstandings
about "the nature of addiction and the risks it posed to patients being treated for
pain." Id. (citing Richard M. Marks & Edward J. Sachar, Undertreatment of Medical
Inpatients with Narcotic Analgesics, 78 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 173, 173-81 (1973)).
18. See MELZACK & WALL, supra note 1, at 52-56.
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it often is not.19 Often viewed as an inevitable part of illness, physi-
cians often expect patients to "tough it out," forcing them to cope with
pain that may be debilitating and unnecessary.2 °
In his exploration of the religious, philosophical, and cultural
underpinnings of our attitudes toward pain, Professor Rich noted a
societal willingness to endure pain as a part of the human experi-
ence.2 Pain has been viewed as an essential part of being human, as
man's punishment for his wickedness,2 a normal part of being alive,'
as well as part of a rite of passage.'
Pain has been described as:
[a]n unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with
actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such
damage. Pain is always subjective. Each individual learns the ap-
plication of the word through experiences related to injury in early
life .... It is unquestionably a sensation in a part or parts of the
body but it is also always unpleasant and therefore also an emo-
tional experience."
Categories of the differing types of pain have usually fallen un-
der two rubrics: acute or chronic pain, with chronic pain subdivided
further into cancer and nonmalignant pain. 6 Acute pain is usually
that of a limited duration, which may be due to an injury, or as the
19. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION EXPERT COMM., Cancer Relief
and Palliative Care, compiled in WHO TEcHNIcAL REPORT SERIES No. 804.
20. Barry R. Furrow, Pain Management and Provider Liability: No More Excuses,
29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28, 29 (2001).
21. Rich, supra note 2, at 26-31.
22. Id. at 26. In the Bible, pain is often a punishment for wickedness. "He is chas-
tened also with pain upon his bed, and the multitude of his bones with strong pain..
Job 33:19 (King James).
23. Rich, supra note 2, at 26-31.
24. Id. For example, boys are encouraged to become men through fierce sports
competition, and children of both sexes are conditioned with phrases such as "no pain
no gain," and "big girl[s] ... don't cry." See id. at 29-30; see also id. at 6-14, 17-21 (pro-
viding a thorough explanation of the societal implications of pain in modern western
culture).
25. INT'L ASSOc. FOR THE STUDY OF PAIN, Pain Terms: A List with Definitions and
Notes on Usage, 6 PAIN 250 (1979) (emphasis in original). Not everyone agrees that
pain is always an emotional experience. See Rich, supra note 2, at 18 n.115 (citing
DAVID B. MORRIS, ILLNESS AND CULTURE IN THE POSTMODERN AGE 118-28 (1998), not-
ing that although pain is usually accompanied by suffering, there are exceptions, such
as the pain of a professional athlete, or that of a woman in labor).
26. Furrow, supra note 20, at 29. Professor Rich discusses pain in three catego-
ries: acute, cancer and chronic nonmalignant (also known as "intractable" or untreat-
able). Professor Rich makes this distinction between chronic and cancer pain to ac-
knowledge that the cancer patient must cope with her pain as a lifelong affliction,
whereas a chronic sufferer's pain will likely increase with the progression of the pa-
tients illness until they die. Rich, supra note 2, at 3 n.8.
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result of surgery or dental work.2" Chronic, nonmalignant pain is of-
ten treated with palliative care, the care of "'patients with active,
progressive, far-advanced disease for whom the prognosis is limited
and the focus of care is quality of life."'
Even when a patient's disease cannot be treated, their pain often
can.29 Chronic pain sufferers, such as some long-term cancer patients,
are candidates for long-term treatment with opioid" analgesics." It is
estimated that millions of cancer patients suffer from pain that can
be adequately treated with one of the many available drug options.3"
Many physicians are hesitant to prescribe appropriate levels of
opioid pain medication, as they believe the medical risks of these
drugs outweigh their benefit. 3 Physicians' concerns include: "prema-
ture death, drug addiction, respiratory depression, and compromised
mental status."'4 Physicians often refuse to prescribe effective doses
of narcotic medications, even to dying patients, for fear they may be-
come addicted. One researcher noted that "It]he treatment of cancer
pain, clearly, is still not based solely on scientific fact but draws on
ignorance, fear, prejudice, and on an invisible, unacknowledged
moral code expressing half-baked notions about the evil of drugs and
the duty to bear affliction."" Many current researchers call this fear
of addiction a "myth."
Adding to the confusion concerning adequate pain relief and the
potential for addicting a chronic pain sufferer, physicians in dis-
agreement about appropriate pain relief may not even share a simi-
lar definition of addiction. 6 Some physicians do not distinguish a
chronic pain sufferer's physical dependence on pain medication from
an addiction to that drug. 7 Physicians also fear running afoul of DEA
27. Furrow, supra note 20, at 29.
28. Id. (quoting OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PALLIATIVE MEDICINE 3 (D. Doyle et al. eds.,
2d ed. 1998).
29. Furrow, supra note 20, at 29.
30. "Originally, a term denoting synthetic narcotics resembling opiates but in-
creasingly used to refer to both opiates and synthetic narcotics." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1268-69 (27th ed. 2000).
31. The Use of Opioids in the Treatment of Chronic Pain, 6 CLINICAL J. OF PAIN 13
(1997).
32. Furrow, supra note 20, at 29.
33. Rich, supra note 2, at 20.
34. Id.
35. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 192.
36. See Mike Mitka, Abuse of Prescription Drugs: Is a Patient Ailing or Addicted?,
283 JAMA 1126 (2000).
37. "If significant numbers of clinicians are unable to make the most basic and
fundamental distinction between addiction and physiological dependence on opioid an-
algesics for the relief of severe pain, then they are unlikely to be able to competently
perform an appropriate risk/benefit analysis among alternative modalities treatment
[Vol. 54:649
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regulations, for which failure to comply could result in their loss of
license to prescribe controlled substances," although this rarely hap-
pens.39
Chronic pain sufferers are very likely to have the authenticity of
their claim of pain challenged by their treating physicians.4" Suffer-
ers of chronic pain do not generally exhibit objectively verifiable pa-
thology that explains their pain.4' Patients suffering from chronic
pain without medically diagnosable manifestations are likely to be
labeled as "drug-seeking" or malingerers.4 Although this problem af-
fects all sufferers, this effect is especially problematic for a prisoner
who is actually in pain, as many prisoners do try to "work the sys-
tem" in prison infirmaries to gain access to drugs.43
Even outside of prisons, the medical profession has not yet em-
braced the principles of pain management recommended by the ex-
perts in this field. " Moreover, not every patient is equally under-
treated. A review of medical literature identifies disparities in the
treatment of pain based upon a patient's race, or the physician's per-
ception of the patient's race.4 Women have a higher prevalence of
and the default position of admonishing the patient to endure the unrelieved pain."
Ben A. Rich, A Prescription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for Pain
Treatment, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 35 (2000).
38. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1306.04, 1306.07, 1306.11 (2001).
39. See Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 676 So. 2d 1380, 1381 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1996) (reversing the Board of Medicine's restriction of the plaintiffs medical
license); In re DiLeo, 661 So. 2d 162, 167-68 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (dismissing all charges
against Doctor DiLeo for violation of the Medical Practice Act); Michael J. Reynolds,
Morphine or Malpractice: Should Courts Recognize a Legal Duty to Prescribe Opiates
for Treating Chronic Pain, 15 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 79, 86-87 (2000).
40. ARTHUR KLEINMAN, THE ILLNESS NARRATIVES: SUFFERING, HEALING, AND THE
HUMAN CONDITION 57 (1988).
41. DAVID B. MORRIS, ILLNESS AND CULTURE IN THE POSTMODERN AGE 119 (1998)
(explaining that current research shows that chronic pain may often derive from "fam-
ily conflict, economic stress, and a history of emotional trauma").
42. Rich, supra note 2, at 22. Professor Rich notes that this propensity for physi-
cians to discount chronic pain sufferer's complaints is completely at odds with their
medical training in which they are taught to listen carefully to a patient's complaints
'and to resist the temptation to rely too heavily on lab tests or other diagnostic proce-
dures." Id. at 22 n.134.
43. Maury J. Greenberg, Prison Medicine, 38 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 167, 167-68
(1988); see infra Part VI (discussing problems regarding the practice of medicine in
prison).
44. The Joint Committee on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations defines
pain management as "a comprehensive approach to the needs of patients, residents,
clients or other individuals served who experience problems associated with acute or
chronic pain." JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORG. (JCAHO)
Guidelines, in PAIN ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT: AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH 3
(2000).
45. Vence L. Bonham, Race, Ethnicity and Pain Treatment: Striving to Understand
the Causes and Solutions to the Disparities in Pain Treatment, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
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chronic pain and are more biologically sensitive to pain than men, yet
women generally receive less aggressive treatment for their pain.46
Children are often perceived as unable to feel pain in the same way
as adults, thereby leading to poor management of their pain.47 The
elderly, particularly those in nursing homes, suffer high levels of
pain, which is likely to be poorly managed.'
The adequate treatment of pain is not only beneficial to a pa-
tient's comfort but it has been shown to have other medical advan-
tages as well. Inadequate control of pain can delay recovery by im-
pairing pulmonary function as well as gastric and bowel functions.49
So not only is alleviation of suffering a humane response, but it may
also lead to improved general health and healing. This may even
have a potential benefit to the cost of caring for the patient."
Even after all these potential barriers to prescribing sufficient
relief have been passed, and a physician has ordered potentially ef-
fective levels of pain relief, the patient may not receive an adequate
dosage. Observers of this problem find that it is widespread, noting
that "clinical surveys continue to indicate that routine orders for in-
tramuscular injections of opioids as needed ... fail to relieve pain in
about half of postoperative patients."" Nurses charged with provid-
ing relief based on physicians' orders are often wary of overmedicat-
ing, especially with opioid narcotics, and often fail to trust the pa-
tient in determining when additional medication is needed.2
Medical researchers have adequately documented this unwill-
ingness of physicians and other health care workers to treat pain ef-
fectively, and the law has begun to recognize that this failure to treat
pain appropriately may give rise to legal liability." Not only prison-
52 (2001). The author notes that although the data reveals disparities in the treat-
ment of blacks and Hispanics as compared to white patients, that other variables were
also influential, such as the type of health care facility and the physician's impression
of the patient's pain. Id. at 60.
46. Diane E. Hoffman & Anita J. Tarzian, The Girl Who Cried Pain: A Bias
Against Women in the Treatment of Pain, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 13, 21 (2001).
47. In a recent study by the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American
Pain Society, researchers found many reasons physicians undermedicate young pa-
tients, including fear of potential side effects, and a belief that pain "builds character."
Maura Kelly, Child Pain is Poorly Treated, Pediatricians' Group Says, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Sept. 5, 2001, at Al, A5.
48. Furrow, supra note 20, at 29.
49. Id. at 37.
50. Medical complications and infections may be avoided by a quicker healing proc-
ess. See id.
51. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY & RESEARCH, ACUTE PAIN MANAGEMENT:
OPERATIVE OR MEDICAL PROCEDURES AND TRAUMA 1 (1992) (emphasis added), avail-
able at http://hstat.nlm.nih.gov/hq/Hquest/screen/contents/s/47086.
52. See id.
53. See Furrow, supra note 20, at 29; Rich, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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ers, but all citizens must have legal recourse to ensure that they do
not needlessly suffer.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL DUTY TO RELIEVE PAIN
The failure to adequately treat pain is considered by many medi-
cal experts to be professional negligence,54 violating a physician's
Hippocratic oath, and the Code of Ethics of the American Medical
Association.55 Many commentators are now advocating that physi-
cians also have a legal duty of relieve pain, the breach of which may
expose them to civil liability through an action for medical malprac-
tice.56
A primary objective of medical malpractice tort law is to ensure
at least a minimum standard of care among physicians. 7 The law
sometimes intervenes when the medical profession does not act
quickly enough to correct problems in health care. EMTALA was a
legislative approach to extend minimum standards of patient care,
creating a prohibition against "patient dumping," at least until a pa-
tient is stabilized. 8 The tort of medical malpractice evolved to include
the doctrine of informed consent, a judicially imposed standard of
care.
59
Although courts are loathe to substitute their judgment for the
54. See N.I. Cherney & R. Cataine, Professional Negligence in the Management of
Cancer Pain, 76 CANCER 2181 (1995).
55. Furrow, supra note 20, at 29. See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 2.20 (Am. Med.
Ass'n 2001). "Physicians have an obligation to relieve pain and suffering and to pro-
mote the dignity and autonomy of dying patients in their care. This includes providing
effective palliative treatment even though it may foreseeably hasten death." Id. Note
that this final sentence pertains to treatment of terminal patients. Id.
56. See Furrow, supra note 20, at 29; Rich, supra note 2, at 3.
57. Furrow, supra note 20, at 30. But see Lawrence Gostin, A Public Health Ap-
proach to Reducing Error: Medical Malpractice as a Barrier, 283 JAMA 1742 (2000).
Although one of the goals of medical malpractice is to ensure these high standards, in
practice, many non-meritorious nuisance claims are brought or settled, and for various
reasons, valid claims of medical malpractice are not litigated. See id. at 1743.
58. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(a) (2001). In 1986, Congress enacted EMTALA to prevent "patient dumping,"
a practice of hospitals denying emergency treatment to uninsured patients or transfer-
ring them without properly stabilizing the emergency condition. In order to establish a
cause of action under EMTALA, a patient with an emergency condition must show
that the hospital failed in one of the following areas: 1) a thorough application of ap-
propriate screening, 2) failure to stabilize the patient's apparent emergency condition;
or 3) failure to follow appropriate transfer procedures. Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am.,
977 F.2d 872, 883 (4th Cir. 1992).
59. Informed consent is a judicially imposed doctrine, requiring physicians to share
information with their patients about the patient's medical condition, treatment op-
tions, risks and benefits, etc. See Christine Laine & Frank Davidoff, Patient-Centered
Medicine: A Professional Evolution, 275 JAMA 152, 152-53 (1996). See infra notes 65-
85 and accompanying text.
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medical decisions of medical professionals, courts have imposed
standards of care on physicians above that of the prevailing stan-
dards of care within the medical community. In Helling v. Carey,5 ° an
ophthalmologist failed to detect glaucoma in his patient, even though
there was a simple, painless, and inexpensive test available.6' The
patient was thirty-two years old at the time and the standard prac-
tice was not to administer'the test for persons under forty years of
age.6 The court held, as a matter of law, that the reasonable stan-
dard of care mandated the administration of the glaucoma test, re-
gardless of the prevailing standard of care among ophthalmologists. 3
Although the patient in Helling did not present any expert testimony
supporting glaucoma testing for persons under forty, a survey of area
ophthalmologists revealed that a "respectable minority" of physicians
tested younger people regularly, thus revealing an evolving standard
of care.' The court's ruling mandated this already developed, but yet
to be widely embraced, higher standard of care.
The evolution of the doctrine of informed consent is another ex-
ample of a "lj]udicially-[i]mposed [s]tandard of [clare."" The cause of
action for failure to obtain informed consent began to appear in
medical malpractice suits in the 1950's.6" Courts began to find, as a
matter of law, that physicians' practices of nondisclosure and silence
were substandard practice. 7 One of the hurdles in informed consent
cases was a tradition of silence from physicians that had endured for
centuries. Trying to prove that it was against standard medical prac-
tice to not gain informed consent from a patient would have been im-
possible, as it was not widely practiced at that time.' In a seminal
case on the doctrine of informed consent, Judge Robinson noted that
the absence of a custom of informed consent is not the same as a cus-
tom of maintaining silence. Judge Robinson remarked that "[r]espect
for the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy
demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which
60. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
61. Id. at 981-83.
62. Id. at 982.
63. Id. at 983 (finding defendant's failure to administer the glaucoma test the
proximate cause of plaintiffs injury).
64. Rich, supra note 2, at 74-75 (citing Jerry Wiley, The Impact of Judicial Deci-
sions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 345, 383
(1981)).
65. See id. at 75-80 (discussing the evolution of the informed consent doctrine).
66. Id. at 76 (explaining the difficulty of obtaining expert medical witnesses to tes-
tify that the physician standard of care required disclosure of treatment risks and
benefits, prior to 1950).
67. Id. at 77 (discussing Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d
170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957), the first case to mention "informed consent").
68. Id.
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physicians ... impose upon themselves." 9
In his argument that the tort of medical malpractice must ex-
pand, Professor Rich noted that "the medical literature over the last
quarter century constitutes not merely a preponderance, but clear
and convincing evidence that under prevailing medical practice there
is a custom of undertreating pain."" As informed consent pushed the
boundaries of medical malpractice, there is now a need to legally pro-
tect patients from physicians' inability or refusal to adequately treat
their pain.7' There is great reluctance to permit courts to set stan-
dards of care, reaching beyond their legal expertise into the practice
of medicine. Rich argues that although clinical standards in pain
management have been set, they have not yet influenced the way
that physicians actually practice.73
Similarly, Professor Furrow argues that this same duty to inform
patients could also be applied to situations of chronic pain.74 Using
this approach, a physician who is unable to effectively manage a pa-
tient's pain, or who is fearful of using opioid analgesics, has a duty to
inform a patient that other treatment options are available." Physi-
cians already have a duty to make a referral when faced with a medi-
cal problem for which they are not experienced." As the specialty of
pain management matures, this duty to refer will likely extend to
pain management specialists for physicians unable or unwilling to
treat their patients' pain.77 As the public becomes more aware that
most medical suffering is unnecessary, it is inevitable that the failure
to properly treat pain will spawn civil claims of liability against phy-
sicians unwilling, or unable to end their patient's suffering. As medi-
cal malpractice standards are not static, lawyers can introduce evi-
dence of advancing clinical standards to show the defect in a physi-
cian's care."7
In the same way, lawyers must continue to keep abreast of
changes in the law;79 a physician has an obligation to avail herself of
69. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
70. Rich, supra note 2, at 80 (opining what a court may conclude should Judge
Robinson's opinion in Canterbury be applied to a duty of effective pain management).
71. Id. (concluding that a standard of care is necessary to protect patients).
72. Id. at 80 n.421.
73. Id. at 81.
74. Furrow, supra note 20, at 35-36.
75. See id.
76. See Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 509 (Wis. 1996). In this case, the
court held that an inexperienced surgeon had a duty to offer a patient a referral to a
nearby more experienced surgeon. Id. at 510.
77. See Furrow, supra note 20, at 30.
78. Id.
79. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 6 (1998) ("To maintain the
requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should engage in continuing study and educa-
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current treatment options for her patients."0 Although the ideal of
adequately treating pain has taken many years to become accepted
medical practice, the fact that adequate pain management is not a
regular part of most medical school's curricula does not make a phy-
sician less liable for failure to treat pain by today's medically ac-
cepted standards."1 The science of medicine continues to expand, but
medical school remains a four-year degree, forcing difficult curricu-
lum decisions. It is not sufficient for a physician to meet required
continuing medical education (CME) requirements of her state to
meet her obligation to keep her medical knowledge current.82 Al-
though the loftier goals of medical malpractice litigation may seek to
set and enforce a higher standard of care, it is not always successful
in this effort.8 " Many malpractice errors are never litigated, and liti-
gated cases often demonstrate no medical negligence; accordingly,
these cases often have no bearing on achieving a higher standard of
medical care.' Nor has everyone had a similar ability to bring such
an action. Prisoners do not usually have adequate remedies in medi-
cal malpractice because the doctrine of qualified immunity shields
prison officers and physicians from liability."
IV. PRISONERS' ACCESS TO ADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE
The doctrine of qualified immunity often compels prisoners to
pursue claims of inadequate medical care in federal court. To over-
come a claim of qualified immunity to pursue an action in federal
court, a claim must survive a two-part analysis. The court must de-
termine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitu-
tional right and if the right was clearly established at the time of the
tion.").
80. "A physician shall continue to study, apply and advance scientific knowledge,
make relevant information available to patients, colleagues, and the public, obtain
consultation, and use the talents of other health professionals when indicated." CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Preamble, at V (Am. Med. Ass'n 2000).
81. Id. at I, VI.
82. Id. § 9.011.
83. Gostin, supra note 57, at 1742-43.
84. Id. at 1743 (citing P.C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993)).
85. See Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1994). "A prison official...
may claim qualified immunity from suit in certain circumstances. This affirmative
defense shields public officials from liability for their discretionary acts that 'do not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable per-
son would have known.'" Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
Even where a plaintiffs federal rights are well-established, qualified immunity is still
available to an official "if it was objectively reasonable for the public official to believe
that his acts did not violate those rights." Kaminsky v. Rosenblum, 929 F.2d 922, 925
(2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
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alleged violation.86 Although many state actors take refuge in the
doctrine of qualified immunity to avoid liability for negligent behav-
ior, it is not intended to protect unlawful conduct. "The purpose of
the doctrine is to shield public officers from liability consequent upon
either a change in law after they acted or enduring legal uncertainty
that makes it difficult for the officer to assess the lawfulness of the
act in question before he does it."87
This shield often acts as a complete defense to all attempts by a
prisoner seeking appropriate medical treatment, or compensation for
a failure to provide adequate care. The current deliberate indiffer-
ence standard in claims of Eighth Amendment violations, would be
sufficient to pierce this shield if adjudicated with recognition of medi-
cines' capability to eliminate suffering.
A prisoner does not lose all of his constitutional rights when in-
carcerated, but keeps those rights that that can be exercised consis-
tently with his imprisonment.88 Prisoners have a constitutional right
to adequate medical care that does not show "deliberate indifference"
to their medical needs,89 grounded in the Eighth Amendment prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment. ° State prisoners pursue
federal claims of cruel and unusual punishment91 for many different
86. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991) (stating that threshold questions
must be answered before discovery is allowed).
87. Ralston v. McGovern, 167 F.3d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that a prison
official was not protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity when the official's re-
fusal to give the prisoner pain medication was "a gratuitous cruelty").
88. Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 495 n.6 (10th Cir. 1983) ("When sentenced
to a prison term, an inmate loses the portion of his liberty interest that is inconsistent
with imprisonment. In particular, he loses his liberty interest in being free from his
jailer's use of force that appears reasonably necessary to maintain or restore disci-
pline.").
89. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (explaining that "deliberate indiffer-
ence" violates the Eighth Amendment).
90. The Eighth Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required,... nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
91. Professor Anthony F. Granucci argued that the framers' intent in including the
clause "cruel and unusual" misinterpreted the 1689 clause of the English Puritans,
which was indeed meant to curb excessive penalties. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 843-
47 (1969). During the original congressional deliberations, including the phrase to the
Bill of Rights, when Mr. Smith of South Carolina objected to the words "nor cruel and
unusual punishments" as being too indefinite, Mr. Livermore of New Hampshire re-
plied, "[t]he clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have
no objection to it; but it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary ....
No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang
a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are
we in [the] future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are
cruel?" Id. at 842 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83 (1789)). The term was not often
invoked in courts throughout the eighteenth century, and commentators of that time
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reasons, including intolerable living conditions, failure to protect
against attack from other prisoners or guards, and failure to provide
adequate medical treatment. Although the Eighth Amendment pro-
tects prisoners from many abuses, this Article will concentrate on
failure to provide adequate medical treatment for the pain of in-
mates.
Medical treatment of prisoners has improved since earlier re-
corded practices of general callousness and incompetence in treating
prisoners.92 Prisoners now are afforded legal protection against for-
mer practices of human experimentation9 3 and outright neglect of
their medical needs.94 Claims to compel adequate care, or to seek
compensation for failures to provide treatment may be brought
against prison officials and physicians under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (here-
inafter § 1983)."5 Section 1983 permits actions against state actors for
deprivations of an individual's constitutional rights.
Section 1983 is not an appropriate cause of action for medical
malpractice or negligence;96 the grievance must rise to a violation of a
prisoner's constitutional protection, which ordinary medical malprac-
tice does not.97 A claim of inadequate medical treatment by a prisoner
thought the clause to be obsolete. Id. at 842. The clause was later applied to punish-
ments that were excessive in proportion to the crime committed. Id. (citing O'Neil v.
Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892)).
92. Michael S. Vaughn, Section 1983 Civil Liability of Prison Officials for Denying
and Delaying Medication and Drugs to Prison Inmates, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 47, 47-48
(1995) (noting the improvement in prison health care).
93. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301-306 (2000).
94. Vaughn, supra note 92, at 48; see also Jordan B. Glaser & Robert B. Greifinger,
Correctional Health Care: A Public Health Opportunity, 118 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
139 (1993).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
For a discussion of the history of § 1983, see McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191
(D. Md. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975). Note that jurisdic-
tion of suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is vested in United States District Courts by 28
U.S.C. § 1343 without allegation of either diversity of citizenship or of any particular
sum in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
96. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106-07 (finding prisoner's claims against a prison physician
not recognizable under § 1983).
97. Id.; see, e.g., Floyd v. Owens, No. 86-7176, 1987 WL 11906, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
June 2, 1987), in which a prisoner complained of inadequate pain relief when he was
given Motrin, an over-the-counter medication for pain for his ulcerous leg. This claim
was rejected, as complaints about medical care do not rise to constitutional claims
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must rise to the level of "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment.98 A disagreement in proper treatment, or
a negligent failure to diagnose, is also not sufficient to sustain a
claim under § 1983. 9 Prisoners seeking relief under § 1983 for failure
to provide adequate medical treatment must show "deliberate indif-
ference" to their medical needs by a state actor in order for the claim
to rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.1°°
This deliberate indifference standard was articulated by the Su-
preme Court in 1976 in Estelle v. Gamble, in which a prisoner
claimed inadequate medical treatment for a back injury he had suf-
fered while in prison.' The Court reviewed the Eighth Amendment's
genesis and previous application in federal courts.0 ' Prior to Estelle,
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment was largely interpreted as a bar against both "harsh or de-
meaning" punishments, and sentences that were not proportional to
the crime committed.' The lower federal courts previously used
various standards to determine the required scienter to pursue a
prisoner's claim for failure to provide adequate medical care."M
"even if [the] treatment is so negligent as to amount to malpractice." Id. In this case,
the court noted that under Estelle, "where a prisoner has received some medical care,
the alleged impropriety of that treatment will not support an [E]ighth [Almendment
claim." Id.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
99. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 98-99.
102. Id. at 102-03. The Court noted in its analysis that the Eighth Amendment was
originally intended to prohibit excessively brutal methods of punishment. Id. at 102.
The Court further explained that the Eighth Amendment required courts to measure
prison standards against "'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency .... '" Id. (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th
Cir. 1968); see also James J. Park, Redefining Eighth Amendment Punishments: A New
Standard for Determining the Liability of Prison Officials for Failing to Protect In-
mates from Serious Harm, 20 QUINNIPiAc L. REV. 407, 437-41 (2001) (discussing the
Supreme Court's approach to protections under the Eighth Amendment).
103. Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due Process of
Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 617, 629 (1997); see also Park, supra note 102, at 434-36,
for an exploration of the disconnection between the act of sentencing and the execution
of the punishment. Professor Park reviews the history of early American prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment and the excesses they were designed to pre-
vent. Id. at 415-29.
104. For a detailed review of the case law concerning a prisoner's access to appro-
priate medication, see Vaughn, supra note 92, at 50-54. Courts' standards included
"under exceptional circumstances," see, e.g., United States v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th
Cir. 1964), and "deliberate infliction of pain," see, e.g., Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d
733, 736 (9th Cir. 1974). However, other courts did not clearly articulate what stan-
dard was used. See, e.g., Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1972). Prior
to Estelle, the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals had already used
the deliberate indifference standard to determine the required mental state of the
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The Court recognized that a prisoner must rely on prison offi-
cials to treat his medical needs, noting that a failure to do so "may
actually produce physical 'torture or a lingering death.""'1 5 Estelle
fixed the appropriate culpable mental state of state actors in claims
of cruel and unusual punishment for failure to provide adequate
medical treatment. °6 The Court held that "such unnecessary suffer-
ing [was] inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency." °7
The Court noted that even "[i]n less serious cases, denial of medical
care may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would
serve any penological purpose.""8 The Court concluded that "deliber-
ate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"' in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.' For Mr. Gamble, the prisoner in this case, this
meant an affirmation of the dismissal of his § 1983 claim, as the facts
in his claim supported "only" an action in negligence or medical mal-
practice; negligence and misdiagnosis do not necessarily meet the
constitutional standard."'
After Estelle, lower federal courts had difficulty determining ex-
actly what constituted deliberate indifference in many differing types
of claims of cruel and unusual punishment,"' prompting the Supreme
Court to attempt a definition in Farmer v. Brennan"' in 1994.
state actor in cases challenging the withholding of medication for serious medical con-
ditions. See, e.g., Massey v. Hutto, 545 F.2d 45, 46-47 (8th Cir. 1976); Westlake v. Lu-
cas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976); Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir.
1972). But see Scharfenberger v. Wingo, 542 F.2d 328, 331 (6th Cir. 1976) (relying on
five different standards: "'fundamental fairness,"' "'woefully inadequate,' "'undue suf-
fering,'" and "'obvious need'"); Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1973)
(requiring "exceptional circumstances").
105. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)).
106. Id. at 102-06; Vaughn, supra note 92, at 49 (noting Estelle established the
framework for legal challenges of this sort).
107. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 104.
110. Id. at 106. Mr. Gamble received many treatments over a three month period,
but the health care providers failed to appropriately diagnose and treat his back injury
which kept him in "'daily pain and suffering.'" Id. at 107.
111. For example, claims of brutality at the hands of guards or other prisoners.
112. 511 U.S. 825, 827 (1994). Dee Farmer was convicted of credit card fraud and
was sentenced to serve time in a federal prison. Id. at 829. At the time of the convic-
tion, Farmer was a preoperative transsexual who, although biologically male, had un-
dergone breast implantation surgery and estrogen therapy. Id. Another prisoner
raped and beat Farmer in Farmer's own cell. Id. at 830. Farmer filed a complaint
claiming that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel
and unusual punishment with deliberate indifference to his safety by placing him in a
violent general prison population, despite knowing that his transsexual status and the
facility's history of inmate violence would make him susceptible to a sexual attack. Id.
at 830-31.
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Farmer established that prison officials violate the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when two
conditions are met, one objective and one subjective. The objective
requirement is that the deprivation alleged is sufficiently serious so
that the prison officials' acts or omissions result in the denial of the
minimum civilized measure of life's necessities."' The subjective re-
quirement requires a finding that the prison officials acted with "'de-
liberate indifference'," that they knew of and disregarded an exces-
sive risk to inmate health and safety." ' The Court rejected Farmer's
"invitation to adopt" a completely objective test for finding deliberate
indifference."' The Court held that a prison official could not be held
liable for Eighth Amendment violations unless such an official
"knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the infer-
ence could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference." 6
The objective element requires that a medical need be serious, if
it presents "'a condition of urgency.., that may produce death, de-
generation, or extreme pain[.""'7 A court may consider "[t]he exis-
tence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find im-
portant and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medi-
cal condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities;
or the existence of chronic and substantial pain...""' "A medical
need is sufficiently serious 'if it is one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even
a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's atten-
tion."'
9
In satisfying the subjective element of an Eighth Amendment
claim, the prisoner must demonstrate deliberate indifference on the
part of prison officials."' Prison officials act with deliberate indiffer-
113. Brown v. Nix, 33 F.3d 951, 954-55 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at
831-33, 837).
114. Id. at 955. (citations omitted).
115. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 11 F.3d 668 (7th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 811 (1994).
116. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
117. Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66 (quoting Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 607 (2d Cir.
1990) (Pratt, J., dissenting)).
118. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other
grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997).
119. Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hunt v.
Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999)).
120. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-37. The courts also distinguish between the rights of a
convicted prisoner and a state held pre-trial detainee, who, as a yet innocent person,
has a Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from punishment altogether. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979); see also Simons v. Clemons, 752 F.2d 1053, 1055
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ence to an inmate's health if they know he faces a substantial risk of
serious harm and disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.'' Such indifference may be proven by showing
that prison officials intentionally denied, delayed access to, or inter-
fered with an inmate's necessary medical care. 22 This standard re-
quires more than a showing of negligent or inadvertent failure to
provide adequate medical care and more than a mere difference of
opinion between a prisoner and the prison medical staff regarding
the proper course of treatment.2 '
The claims of prisoners under these federal actions have been
based on the standard of deliberate indifference to their serious
medical needs, yet, this standard is largely based on an outdated
model of adequate pain treatment. As reviewed, supra Part II, not
just prisoners, but most American citizens are largely under-treated
for their pain. Next, this Article will explore the application of the
current legal standard in cases of prisoner's complaints of pain.
V. APPLICATION OF THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD IN
PRISONER COMPLAINTS OF PAIN
A. The Objective Element in Cases of Prisoners' Pain
The objective element of a claim of cruel and unusual punish-
ment requires a claim for failure to appropriately treat a "serious
(5th Cir. 1985). Simons, a former pre-trial detainee was denied access to prescription
pain medication for two hours. Id. at 1054-55. Although Simons relied on Eighth
Amendment medical care denial cases, the court found this standard was not directly
applicable; instead, the court assessed whether the deprivation of medication violated
Simon's Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from treatment amounting to pun-
ishment. Id. at 1055. The court noted that the Supreme Court, in City of Revere v.
Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239 (1983), found that pre-trial detainees
had, at a minimum, the same rights owed to a convicted prisoner. Simons, 752 F.2d at
1056 n.1. To determine whether Simon's treatment amounted to punishment, the
court focused on whether there was an express intent to punish, or whether "'it [was]
but an incident of some other legitimate government purpose."' Id. at 1056 (quoting
Bell, 441 U.S. at 538). The legitimate government purpose was determined to be the
need to prevent drugs from reaching other incarcerated prisoners. Id. The court found
that the two-hour delay was not excessive, nor did Simons make any allegations that
the deprivation was intended as punishment. Id. Federal pre-trial detainees are pro-
tected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d
998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1976). A prisoner may assert damages based on a constitutional
violation under § 1983 against state actors, or under federal employees through an ac-
tion implied in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
395-97 (1971).
121. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-40.
122. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
123. Id. at 105.
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medical need." 4 In Eight Amendment prisoner claims, this is usually
not the element in dispute."' Most prisoner's claims are usually de-
nied for failure to meet the subjective requirement of deliberate indif-
ference on the part of prison officials.
Although it may be difficult to know if a prisoner is drug seeking
or actually in pain, requiring a completely objective test should never
be the standard, as it may invite other potential abuses. 2' In the case
of Cooper v. Casey, the prisoners were beaten by guards and re-
quested treatment and pain medication, but were denied treatment
for forty-eight hours. 7 The court rejected the defendants' argument
that there should be some objective injury, such as "the sort of thing
that might reveal itself on an x-ray, or in missing teeth, or in a
bruised and battered physical appearance."" The court was con-
cerned that this standard might provide immunity from claims of de-
liberate indifference to guards who might sadistically "inflict sub-
stantial and prolonged pain without leaving any 'objective' traces on
the body of the victim."29
The subjective nature of pain in other litigation requires courts
to look beyond objectively verifiable manifestations, such as in Social
Security and Medicare claims for chronic pain.2 0 In these claims,
124. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on
other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (defining a
"serious' medical need" as one that, if untreated, could cause further injury or severe
and unnecessary pain).
125. Obvious examples of complaints that courts have declined to deem as "'serious'
medical conditions" are cold symptoms and minor aches and pains. See, e.g., Cooper v.
Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that a prison official's refusal to "dis-
pense bromides for the sniffles or minor aches and pains or a tiny scratch or a mild
headache or minor fatigue ... does not ... violate the Constitution."); Gibson v. McE-
vers, 631 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that failure to treat a common cold does
not violate the Eighth Amendment).
126. See Cooper, 97 F.3d at 917 (emphasizing that an objective inquiry "would con-
fer immunity from claims of deliberate indifference on sadistic guards").
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1988)).
130. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Standard and Sufficiency of Evidence When
Evaluating Severity of Claimant's Pain in Social Security Disability Case Under §
3(a)(1) of Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C.A. §
423(d)(5)(A), 165 A.L.R. FED. 203, 203 (2000). "The majority of courts require only
subjective evidence of the severity of a claimant's pain; courts in the minority require
objective evidence to support any subjective testimony of the severity of pain experi-
enced by a claimant." Id. In Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789
(9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that if the government con-
cludes that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits suffers from infirmities
that may cause pain, then the claimant cannot be denied benefits merely because




courts may use purely subjective evidence, or a combination of both
subjective and objective indicia on which to base their determina-
tions. '3
Ralston v. McGovern,' reversed a case in which a prisoners'
claim was denied for not meeting the objective, element's requirement
of a serious medical condition. In Ralston, a prisoner, who suffered
from cancer, complained that he could not swallow and was spitting
blood.' A guard denied the prisoner his prescribed pain medica-
tion.' His claim was dismissed by the district court, because al-
though there was sufficient support in the complaint to show deliber-
ate indifference, the court found that the prisoner failed to present a
serious medical condition that constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.'35 The appellate court noted that a medical need could be as
serious as treatment needed immediately to save a patient's life, to a
need so inconsequential such as "trivial discomforts" and "cosmetic
imperfections.""' The court found these poles to be obvious examples
of Eighth Amendment violations and non-violations respectively.'37
The court noted that drawing the line "is a matter of determining the
civilized minimum of public concern for the health of prisoners,
which depends on the particular circumstances of the individual
prisoner." 8 This is the part of the test that the court found difficult
to generalize, but added that the "civilized minimum" analysis might
be further reduced to an examination of the costs and benefits of the
treatment.'39 The court noted that Ralston, the prisoner, was not de-
manding costly treatment, not anything esoteric or unconventional,
only the pain medication already prescribed for him. The court found
the guard's denial of Ralston's pain medication to be gratuitous cru-
elty.4 ° "The lower the cost, the less need has to be shown, but the
need must still be shown to be substantial. It seems to us that to re-
fuse to treat, at trivial cost, the pain caused by cancer and cancer
treatments borders on the barbarous." 4' The court noted that the
"terror which cancer inspires magnifies the pain and discomfort of
the frequent side effects of cancer treatments," calculating the par-
131. Wooster, supra note 130, at 239-40.
132. Ralston v. McGovern, 167 F.3d 1160 (7th Cir. 1999).
133. Id. at 1161.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quotations added)
137. Id. at 1161-62.
138. Id. at 1162.
139. See id. (noting that the lower the cost of the requested treatment, the less need
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ticular circumstances of Ralston's illness in its analysis. 142
Some medical problems are easier to identify objectively than
others. A broken bone can often be seen even without an x-ray, and
thus is verifiable even when not visible to the naked eye. These
claims generally pass the subjective element easily. Courts are likely
to find that delay or avoidance in treatment for a prisoner's broken
bone is deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. In a pre-
Farmer case, Brown v. Hughes,' the court found that with a painful
injury, such as a broken foot,
it may be that deliberately indifferent delay, no matter how brief,
would render defendants liable as if they had inflicted the pain
themselves. Deliberately inflicted pain, as with an electrical cattle
prod, does not become unimportant and unactionable under the
[E]ighth [A]mendment simply because the pain produced is only
momentary.'"
The court noted that even if they found that delays of minutes or
seconds were de minimus delays, the delay "on the order of hours," in
providing treatment for a broken foot is sufficient for a constitutional
claim. '
In another pre-Farmer case, the pain of a broken arm was found
to have the potential of such an excruciating injury as to mandate
expedited attention of a doctor's care.146 In Loe v. Armistead, a delay
of eleven hours for an inmate to see a doctor was considered a suffi-
cient pleading to survive a motion to dismiss of the prisoner's claim
of cruel and unusual punishment.147 This ruling was made in spite of
the fact that the prisoner was provided pain medication soon after
the accident causing the break." In a footnote, the court in Loe clari-
fied its holding, so as to correct a dissenting judge's characterization.
[O]ur holding is that the complaint of a prisoner under § 1983
against responsible state and federal officials is not subject to
summary dismissal when he alleges that, with deliberate indiffer-
ence, the defendants failed to have his painful and obviously broken
arm examined until [eleven] hours after his injury and failed to
have it x-rayed until [twenty-two] hours after his injury." '
The court noted that unusual length of the delay supported an in-
ference of deliberate indifference, noting that "an indigent could
142. Id.
143. 894 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1990).
144. Id. at 1538.
145. Id.
146. Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1296 (4th Cir. 1978).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1297 (Hall, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1296 n.3.
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reasonably expect faster treatment at a hospital emergency
room."
150
Claims of deliberate indifference by prisoners for pain due to bro-
ken bones are rare post-Farmer."' Cases which are more likely to be
appealed are claims of delay or substitution of a prisoner's prescribed
pain medication.
B. The Subjective Element in Cases of Prisoners' Pain
As with other standards that include a subjective component,
various courts apply the standard of deliberate indifference diversely.
The clearest example of deliberate indifference would be the case in
which it was possible to show that a prison official withheld treat-
ment to intentionally inflict pain.'52 This is almost never the case in
claims of cruel and unusual punishment. However, even before
Farmer refined the definition of deliberate indifference, courts found
deliberate indifference in particularly egregious cases of neglect."3
In a pre-Farmer, First Circuit case, a prisoner had been denied
pain medication by the prison nurse, "because the injury had oc-
curred before [the inmate] went to prison."" The nurse felt that be-
cause the injury had nothing to do with whathappened to him in the
prison, she "'was not responsible for care or treatment [of his injured]
hand."'15' The prisoner was also denied the opportunity to go outside
the prison and see another health care provider concerning the in-
jury.156 In finding that the nurse had indeed been deliberately indif-
ferent to the prisoner's pain, the court explained the difficulty in
making this determination, noting that the "obvious case would be a
denial of needed medical treatment in order to punish the inmate."'57
But the court found that "deliberate indifference may also reside in
150. Id. at 1296.
151. However, in Senisais v. Fitzgerald, 940 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Ill. 1996), an inmate
brought an action against prison physicians for failure to treat his broken hand. Id. at
198. Although the prisoner stated he experienced excruciating pain for eight days, he
did not claim this suffering as his reason for pursuing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleg-
ing inadequate medical care. Id. at 200. The court held that allegations that the in-
mate's broken hand was not set in a cast until nine days after the fall were sufficient
to state claim of deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious medical needs. Id. at 199;
see also Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1999), in which a fail-
ure to diagnose a prisoner's broken ribs was characterized as possibly negligent, but
not deliberately indifferent. Id. at 525.
152. See Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The obvious case
would be a denial of needed medical treatment in order to punish the inmate.").
153. Id. at 539-40.
154. Id. at 539.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 540.
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'wanton' decisions to deny or delay care1 ' . .. where the action is reck-
lessness, 'not in the tort law sense but in the appreciably stricter
criminal-law sense, requiring actual knowledge of impending harm,
easily preventable."'1 9 The prisoner later received treatment and
"another round of surgery" was recommended.' The court ruled that
although the nurse was obviously aware of the prisoner's pain, she
did nothing to treat it and vacated dismissal of the prisoner's § 1983
claim and remanded it for further proceedings. 6'
In Johnson v. Hardin County,"2 the Court of Appeals concluded
that a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference in the ac-
tions of prison guards for not properly providing a prisoner his pre-
scribed pain medication.'63 Johnson was permanently disabled as a
result of a prior motorcycle accident and had persistent problems
with his legs, leading him to request a small cell and a lower bunk,
both of which were denied."M Johnson's guards did not always provide
him with his prescribed doses of medication, and when they did, they
would often throw his pills into his cell, where they would sometimes
roll out of his reach.'65 The prison officials' refusal to alter the prison
policy of distributing drugs every six hours to every four hours, as to
accommodate Johnson's prescription for Tylenol-3, was not found to
be deliberate indifference.166 Proving a systemic mistreatment of pris-
oners, rising to the level of deliberate indifference is a higher stan-
dard, which had not been met in this case. 67
The above cases were appeals of lower court rulings dismissing
the prisoners' claims prior to the ruling in Farmer. After Farmer,
with the deliberate indifference standard more clearly articulated,
prisoners' appeals have not generally been for circumstances so bla-
tantly cruel.
Until recently, almost any attempt at treatment, no matter how
futile or feeble prevented a prisoner from successfully claiming delib-
erate indifference.' Courts often stated that these claims may have
158. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991)).
159. Id. (citing DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991)).
160. Id. at 539.
161. Id. at 540-41.
162. 908 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1990).
163. Id. at 1284.
164. Id. at 1282.
165. Id. at 1284.
166. Id. at 1286-87.
167. See id. at 1287. This implicates the Farmer requirement of knowledge.
168. See, e.g., Floyd v. Owens, No. 86-7176, 1987 WL 11906, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 2,
1987). In Floyd, the court noted that under Estelle, "where a prisoner has received
some medical care, the alleged impropriety of that treatment will not support an
[E]ighth [A]mendment claim." Id.
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been valid claims of medical malpractice, but did not rise to constitu-
tional violations of a prisoner's rights.169 After Farmer, some courts
were willing to look at the quality of the treatment given to deter-
mine whether the medical care was adequate to avoid a constitu-
tional violation.
In a Seventh Circuit case, a prisoner, Sherrod, complained of se-
vere abdominal pain and was seen by prison doctors on many occa-
sions over a two-week period. 7° Although Sherrod continued to suffer
severe abdominal pain and high temperatures, the cryptic phrase
"rule out appendicitis" was repeatedly entered into his medical record
by the prison's medical staff.' It was not clear if the phrase was an
instruction to actually rule out appendicitis, or if it was stating that
indeed appendicitis had been ruled out.'72 Finally, Sherrod was taken
to the hospital where it was revealed he had a ruptured appendix
and a gangrenous bowel. 7' The district court ruled that the prison
medical staff did not show deliberate indifference because Sherrod
received continuous medical treatment.' Based on its resolution of
questions of material fact in favor of the defendants, the district
court found that Sherrod's symptoms "'did not match those of appen-
dicitis' on the second day he requested medical assistance.' The ap-
peals court concluded that the lower court's findings of fact consti-
tuted reversible error, because it was clear that Sherrod had symp-
toms of appendicitis on the first day he sought treatment.'76 The ap-
peals court also found that the lower court should have examined the
entire period of time when he was complaining of pain. 77 With all of
the evidence available, the appeals court found that a jury could rea-
sonably find that the prison health care workers acted with deliber-
ate indifference towards Sherrod."' The appeals court noted that
"[t]he question mandated by Farmer is whether the official knew of
and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate's health, not whether
the inmate was ignored." 7' The appeals court found that Sherrod had
presented sufficient evidence "that the prison staff knew of and dis-
169. See, e.g., id. For many of these state prisoners, a claim of medical malpractice
was without value as the prison officials at fault were protected by qualified immunity.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
170. Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 608-09 (7th Cir. 2000).
171. Id. at 608.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 609.





179. Id. at 612.
[Vol. 54:649
RAISING THE "CIVILIZED MINIMUM"
regarded a serious risk to his health ....
Another recent case in the Seventh Circuit also showed a court's
unwillingness to accept any treatment as proof that the treating offi-
cials were not deliberately indifferent.' The Seventh Circuit re-
versed the dismissal of a prisoner's complaint of a refusal to provide
him surgical treatment for pain prescribed by a physician."' A physi-
cian at the prison examined the prisoner who complained about wrist
pain, and referred him to a specialist at a local hospital.8 The pris-
oner was diagnosed as having calcium overgrowths, requiring sur-
gery to alleviate his pain.' Before surgery occurred, the prisoner was
transferred to another prison where the attending physician exam-
ined him and agreed that he needed the surgery, but told him that
the prison did not provide such treatment. 8' Two other doctors gave
him similar advice. 88 After repeatedly requesting treatment for a pe-
riod of three years, he filed a grievance, which was denied, after
which he filed a § 1983 claim.'87 The Court of Appeals noted that
"It]he subjective element of deliberate indifference encompasses con-
duct such as a refusal to treat a prisoner's chronic pain."88 The court
below dismissed the prisoner's claim because the prisoner had failed
to establish that the prison officials' alleged refusal to treat his condi-
tion was more than mere negligence or dissatisfaction with his
treatment.' The Court of Appeals did not accept the defendant's
argument that because the prisoner was seen by prison doctors, he
was receiving treatment and merely disagreed with the diagnosis.
The court found that the prisoner's acknowledgment that he saw the
doctors did not negate his claim, noting "[pirisoners are not required
to show that they were completely ignored by prison medical staff to
demonstrate deliberate indifference." 19'
In Sanocki v. Renb, " ' a prisoner received many treatments for
non-malignant tissue growth, but was given a different pain medica-
180. Id.
181. Adams v. Detella, No. 98-1613, 2000 WL 1763342, at *4 (7th Cir. Nov. 22,
2000).





187. Id. at *2.
188. Id. at *3 (citing Jones v. Simek, 193 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1999), affd sub
nom. Jones v. Lopez, No. 01-1798, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22880, at *6 (7th Cir. Oct. 18,
2001)).
189. Adams, No. 98-1613, 2000 WL 1763342, at *2.
190. Id. at *3 (citing Sherrod, 223 F.3d at 612).




tion than the one prescribed by a consultant surgeon.92 Although
there was a question of adequacy of the pain relief given, the court
also noted that the prisoner had received many different treatments,
and that any delays in the treatment did not rise to the level of con-
stitutional violations. 3
The difficulties of treating patients in a prison environment often
lead to delays in treatment.194 These delays in treatment can be espe-
cially devastating to a prisoner in pain, who has no other source of
aid. How long is too long to suffer? The answer is not uniform in the
various courts, and may employ a calculus that includes the length of
the delay and the severity of the pain.
Even prior to Farmer, a prisoner's complaint that a nurse denied
him prescribed pain medication, as well as dressing changes, for five
days was sufficient grounds to state an Eighth Amendment cause of
action. 9 ' In Boretti v. Wiscomb,'96 a nurse refused to treat an inmate
or contact a doctor over a holiday weekend to verify the inmate's pain
prescription.'97 The patient suffered a gunshot wound, incurred while
he was an escapee, and was treated surgically at a hospital and sent
to a holding cell at Oakland County Jail. The cells at the jail had no
beds, so the inmate slept on the floor, which he complained made his
pain worse. Despite being prescribed 800 mg of Motrin, he was de-
nied any pain medication by his captors. The court observed that the
nurse could have verified the legitimacy of the prisoner's pain pre-
scription with one phone call.199 In answer to other defenses the nurse
proffered, the court also noted that simply because the wound even-
tually healed, this did not mean that the prisoner did not suffer
damages.'99 The court also ruled that the prisoner could recover "for
any injury caused by the delay in care and any concomitant pain, suf-
fering, or mental anguish."'2 9
A year after Boretti, the Seventh Circuit reversed a dismissal of
a claim for failure to treat a prisoner's pain for four months.9 ' The
192. Id. at *2.
193. Id. at *4.
194. See infra Part IV (discussing some of the problems of providing medical care in
prisons).
195. Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1152 (6th Cir. 1991), reh'g en banc denied,
No. 90-1427, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 1759, at *1 (6th Cir. July 9, 1991), rev'd on re-
mand, No. 92-2203, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20608, at *7-8 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 1993).
196. 930 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir 1991).
197. Id. at 1152.
198. Id. at 1154.
199. Id. at 1155.
200. Id. (quoting Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 611 (6th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis
omitted).
201. Jones, 193 F.3d at 490-92.
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district court was reversed for drawing conclusions of fact in favor of
the prison officials."2 In an affidavit, the prisoner alleged the doctor
had refused to prescribe him pain medication when needed, as well
as failing to provide him access to a specialist for a six-month pe-
riod."°3 The court ruled that, if proven, these actions meet the defini-
tion of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs required un-
der Estelle and Farmer.2 °4
C. Substitution of Prescribed Medication
As noted above, pre-Farmer, almost any attempt at treatment
would undermine a prisoner's claim of deliberate indifference to his
medical needs. This has still been largely true for claims in which a
prisoner's pain was not treated successfully by drugs that were sub-
stituted for stronger, often narcotic prescriptions. In cases in which
prisoners were given aspirin, Excedrin, or Ibuprofen (Motrin), when
a stronger pain medication had been prescribed and refused to the
prisoner, courts generally have not found deliberate indifference on
the part of prison officials.2"'
In Zigmund v. Walsh,"' a prisoner who had been prescribed both
Excedrin and Ativan, a stronger pain relief medication, lost a sum-
mary judgment appeal finding that the prison officials' refusal to give
him the stronger drug, as well as failure to provide even Excedrin for
periods of three and a half hours was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment."7 In denying the prisoner's claim, the court noted that
the prisoner did not claim that "he was in serious pain" in his decla-
rations to the court.00 This appears to be evidence of the court's un-
willingness to protect the rights of a pro se litigant in navigating the
appeals process. In other cases, courts are very liberal in their read-
ing of prisoners' pro se claims when analyzing whether the claim
states a valid cause of action. Failure to state that he was in serious
pain may have been an inadvertent omission on his part, or he may
have assumed that a reasonable person would know his requests for
medication, especially for narcotics, were for serious pain.
As mentioned above, in Sanocki, °0 a prisoner received many
treatments for non-malignant tissue growth, but was given a differ-
ent pain medication than the one prescribed by a consultant sur-
202. Id. at 491-92.
203. Id. at 490.
204. Id. at 489.
205. See, e.g., Zigmund v. Walsh, No. 98-2862, 1999 WL 491869, at *1 (2d Cir. July
8, 1999).
206. Id.
207. Id. at *2.
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. Sanocki, No. 96-3603-KHV, 1998 WL 184460, at *1.
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geon. 10 The prison physician substituted Tylenol-3, for the prescribed
medication, Propoxephene, for which there was no "'direct equivalent'
approved for prescription to federal inmates."211 The court found no
deliberate indifference, as the prisoner had been seen by various
physicians on multiple occasions. The substitute of medication could
have been characterized as negligent, or an inadvertent failure to
properly treat, but did not rise to the level of a constitutional viola-
tion. 2
Similarly, in Holleman v. Duckworth,"3 the court found no delib-
erate indifference in a substitution of a less potent pain medication.
The prisoner in Holleman had been given Tylenol for his pain associ-
ated with his treatment for hepatitis. Physicians at a hospital later
recommended he be given Darvon instead of Tylenol, as they believed
the Tylenol stressed his liver, undercutting his liver treatment.14 Be-
cause Darvon is a mild narcotic, the prison was unwilling to dispense
it and instead substituted aspirin, Ibuprofen, and salasate.211 The
court found that this substitution did not rise to the level of indiffer-
ence to the prisoner's medical needs. 6 Finding that the prison had a
legitimate interest in limiting the use of narcotics by prisoners, the
court found no constitutional violation, as the prisoner had been
treated for his pain. 7 As will be discussed below, prisons have found
ways to reduce the abuse of prescription methods, especially those
drugs used for chronically ill patients.218
Cases in which prescribed narcotics are not made available to a
prisoner are not rare. In Thomas v. O'Haver,"1 ' a nurse confiscated a
prisoner's pain medication for back pain upon his arrival to the
prison.22 ° The court found that the prisoner's failure to communicate
the extent of his pain, and the nurse's reasonable belief that his con-
dition might not be necessarily serious was sufficient to sustain the
lower court's summary judgment for the defendants against the pris-
oner's § 1983 claim.221 In an Arizona case concerning the substitution
210. Id. at *2.
211. Id.
212. Id. at*4.
213. Holleman v. Duckworth, No. 99-1004, 1999 WL 1082511, at *1 (7th Cir. Nov.
15, 1999).
214. Id. at *1.
215. Id. at*1.
216. Id. at *1.
217. Id.
218. See infra notes 250-51 and accompany text.
219. No. 97-1877, 1998 WL 171270, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 2, 1998).
220. Id. She also confiscated his medication for erectile dysfunction, but the pris-
oner's § 1983 claim for denial of this medication, Yohimbine, was also quashed. Id. at
*3.
221. Id. at *2.
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of pain medication, the court found no deliberate indifference when
the prison physician prescribed Darvocet, a milder narcotic than Per-
coset, which a physician in a specialty clinic had originally prescribed
for the pain the prisoner suffered after an automatic cell door severed
the tip of his finger."'
Other cases have illuminated prison officials' concerns about pre-
scribing narcotic pain relief. In Logan v. Clarke,"3 a prisoner who had
a history of narcotic abuse was offered other types of pain medi-
cation, none of which successfully alleviated his pain." The prisoner
did not claim that the painkillers he received had no effect, prompt-
ing the court to opine, "[h]e cannot expect them to eliminate all
pain-painkillers usually do not."2 This lack of awareness of the ca-
pabilities of effective pain management is not isolated in the Eighth
Circuit.
In a recent case in New York, because there was no evidence
presented that would show that the prison doctor's decision to substi-
tute a non-narcotic drug was based on anything other than her medi-
cal judgment, the claim failed to survive an analysis of deliberate in-
difference required of an Eighth Amendment claim. 6 In Douglas v.
Stanwick, the prisoner had been treated outside of the prison for a
fracture in his hand, and had been given a prescription for Darvocet,
a narcotic pain medication, by the treating physician.2 The prison
doctor, sensitive to problems of dispensing narcotics in prison, substi-
tuted Tylenol for the prisoner's pain.22 Even after the prisoner was
again prescribed Darvocet at his follow up visit with the outside phy-
sician, the prison doctor would permit him only Tylenol when he
complained of pain. 9 The court noted that when two physicians dis-
agree on the course of treatment, it does not follow that one of them
is acting with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's needs.2"' The
court found that this is especially relevant when one of the physi-
cians is "more familiar with the jail or prison environment, and
therefore more sensitive to the need to restrict narcotics use.""' A
222. Ransom v. Arizona, No. 94-16427, 1995 WL 608438, at *1, 4-5 (9th Cir. Oct. 16,
1995).
223. 119 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that prison doctors "were not delib-
erately indifferent" because the prisoner's failure to cooperate led to a delay of medical
treatment and the doctors made a reasonable effort to cure the prisoner).
224. Id. at 649.
225. Id. at 650.
226. Douglas v. Stanwick, 93 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324-25 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
227. Id. at 322.
228. See id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 325.




disagreement between a physician and a prisoner or between physi-
cians does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation."2 The
court found that this type of disagreement may give rise to a medical
malpractice action, when available, but not to a constitutional
claim. 3 Given that most Americans are ignorant of the fact that
most pain suffering is unnecessary, and that most physicians have
not yet embraced modern principals of modern pain management,
this result seems understandable. But as it becomes common knowl-
edge that almost all suffering caused by pain is avoidable, is a will-
ingness to permit a prisoner to endure pain not only deliberately in-
different, but tantamount to deliberate infliction of pain?
As effective pain management becomes the norm, a twenty-four
hour delay of a patient's prescribed medication as seen in a recent
case in Texas, Augustus v. Dallas County Jail,2" should trigger
Eighth Amendment protections. In Augustus, a prisoner was forced
to wait twenty-four hours for pain medication following an accident
to his hand, as the medication did not arrive with him back from the
hospital where he was treated.235 Although a recent case, the court
curiously relied on cases cited in Estelle236 to find that this delay was
not a deliberate indifference to the prisoner's suffering.237
VI. PROBLEMS OF PRACTICING MEDICINE IN PRISON
Practical and logistic problems inherent in the practice of medi-
cine in prisons make diagnosis and treatment of prisoner pain diffi-
cult. The constantly growing population of prisoners adds to these
problems. The total numbers of prisoners in federal or state adult
correctional facilities continues to rise, most recently to include about
one out of every 137 U.S. residents.2" Most of the incoming popula-
tion has had little access to health care, and comes to the prison with
a higher rate of disease than the general population.239 Obviously,
232. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 588-89 (7th Cir. 1996) (concerning an inmate's
claim of an Eighth Amendment violation when his toenail was removed without anes-
thesia and he was forced to shower in standing water).
233. Id. at 590-91.
234. No. 3:00-CV-2451-R, 2001 WL 363053, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2001) (finding
that a twenty-four hour delay in proving pain medication was not deliberate indiffer-
ence).
235. Id.
236. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
237. Augustus, No. 3:00-CV-2451-R, 2001 WL 363053, at *2.
238. ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1999 at 1 (Aug.
2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/p99.htm. Over 71,000 of the
1,366,721 prisoners were held in privately operated prisons. Id. at 6. For the purposes
of Section 1983 claims, the prison workers and physicians are still considered state
actors.
239. Prisons have higher incidents of many communicable diseases, including HIV,
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prisons are unattractive places to live, but they are also depressing,
often frightening places in which to practice medicine.24 ° Although
there are exemplary clinicians working in prisons in the United
States, prisons are also known to hire unlicensed physicians and oth-
ers with questionable backgrounds. 1 Abusive doctor-patient rela-
tionships at prison hospitals are thought to be somewhat common.24
Correctional facilities may accredit both their medical facilities
and health care workers through the National Commission on Cor-
rectional Health Care, which sets standards through voluntary ac-
creditation.243 These prisons that take advantage of this voluntary ac-
creditation are not likely to be the institutions that have the dubious
hiring practices. Although beyond the scope of this Article, manda-
tory accreditation of prison health care facilities should be consid-
ered.
Despite our nation's shameful earlier history of treatment of its
prisoners, we have made substantial progress in treating incarcer-
ated people more humanely. With Estelle,'" the groundbreaking case
in 1976, the Supreme Court recognized that denial of medical atten-
tion could be cruel and unusual punishment.242 Pain management for
terminally ill prison patients has substantially improved in the last
decade, mostly through adoption of hospice programs, but also due to
some general advancement in pain management protocols, particu-
larly with cancer patients.46 Within the prison hospice population
there are still complaints of overly conservative treatment with
tuberculosis, hepatitis B virus infection, and gonorrhea. See also Jordan B. Glaser &
Robert B. Greifinger, Correctional Health Care: A Public Health Opportunity, 118 AN-
NALS INTERNAL MED. 139, 139 (1993).
240. James E. Lessenger, Health Care in Jails: A Unique Challenge in Medical
Practice, 72 POSTGRADUATE MEDICINE 131, 131-32 (1982).
241. See generally Andrew A. Skolnick, Prison Deaths Spotlight How Boards Handle
Impaired, Disciplined Physicians, 280 JAMA 1387, 1387-90 (1998). This article details
cases of physicians who have committed serious professional misconduct, resulting in
lost or restricted licensing, yet manage to secure positions as prison doctors, where
some continue to endanger the lives of their patients. Id.
242. See, e.g., ASSEMBLY SELECT COMM. ON PRISON REFORM & REHAB., AN EXAMI-
NATION OF CALIFORNIA'S PRISON HOSPITALS 60-61 (1972), cited in Estelle, 429 U.S. at
111 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. AM. COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, ET AL., The Crisis in Correctional Health Care:
The Impact of the National Drug Control Strategy on Correctional Health Services, 117
ANNALS INT. MED. 71, 71 (1992) [hereinafter AM. COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, ET AL.]. By
1991, the "NCCHC accredited 73 prisons (11%) and 230 Jails (7%)." Id. In 2000, fewer
than 25% of facilities had been certified. CORRECTIONAL NEWS, Vol. 7, No. 5,
Sept./Oct. 2001, at 22.
244. 429 U.S. at 97.
245. Id. at 104-05.
246. Fleet W. Maull, Issues in Prison Hospice: Toward a Model for the Delivery of
Hospice Care in a Correctional Setting, 13 THE HOSPICE J. 57, 68 (1998).
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opioid drugs for terminally ill patients, but some improvement has
been documented. 47
In addition to the tradition of under-treating pain in general,
pain relief may be cautiously meted out to suffering prisoners be-
cause of the potential for abuse of these drugs. Indeed, some prison-
ers routinely abuse sick call and medical service procedures in pris-
ons for social reasons. 48 Some experts recommend erring on the side
of caution in dealing with manipulative patients, diagnosing patients
who are "malingering, faking or hysteri[cal]" carefully by "exclusion,"
so as not to potentially endanger a prisoners' life.249
Strict controls can be administered to ensure that prescribed
medication is used to treat a prisoner's pain."' In a California state
prison hospice program, pain medication is monitored closely by staff
and "[e]very pill, injection, etc. is accounted for," as well as the pa-
tient's "intake and response[s]. '51 Personnel who administer medica-
tions to prisoners must also protect against attempts to stockpile
medications for potential suicide attempts, or for trade with other
inmates.252 One expert suggests administering liquid medications
whenever possible to guard against "pouching," that is, holding a pill
in the mouth and retrieving it once the prisoner is alone.25 Although
hoarding prescribed medications is not an insubstantial problem, it
pales in comparison to the problem of prisoner access to a variety of
illegal substances. In spite of extraordinary precautions to prevent
their import into the prison community, illegal drug and alcohol use
among prisoners is endemic in prisons.25 ' The market for these con-
traband drugs is well established, as it is estimated that seventy-five
percent of prisoners entering state facilities, and two-thirds of all
federal prisoners have substance abuse problems requiring treat-
ment.5
247. Id.
248. Id. Sometimes referred to as "skaters," these prisoners may just seek an outlet
for social interaction with others, or may be drug seeking.
249. Lessenger, supra note 240, at 143. Dr. Lessenger recommends taking each
prisoner's claim seriously, giving each prisoner a thorough examination, ordering
tests, double checking the patient's history, even admitting the patient to the hospital
for observation. Dr. Lessenger realizes that this may be playing into the prisoner's
manipulative wishes; it may also be lifesaving. Id. at 143-44.
250. Maull, supra note 246, at 69.
251. Id.
252. Maury J. Greenberg, Prison Medicine, 38 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 167, 170 (1988).
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., Lessenger, supra note 240, at 133.
255. AM. COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, ET AL., supra note 243, at 74.
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VII. APPLICATION OF THE EXISTING LEGAL STANDARD WITH THE
REALITY OF THE CAPABILITIES OF EFFECTIVE PAIN MANAGEMENT
Deliberate denial of requests for medical assistance has long
been held to be a form of cruel and unusual punishment, "provided
that the illness or injury ... is sufficiently serious or painful to make
the refusal of assistance uncivilized."25 The Supreme Court has found
that the definition of cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment, is not fixed in stone, but expands and "may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice."257 The Court has recognized "that the words of the Amend-
ment are not precise, and that their scope is not static."58 In his fas-
cinating history of the concept of cruel and unusual punishment, Jus-
tice Marshall commented on its ability to keep pace with social mo-
res, noting "a penalty that was permissible at one time in our Na-
tion's history is not necessarily permissible today.""9
Certainly our nation no longer permits deliberate infliction of
physical punishment on our prisoners.60 The notion of whipping a
prisoner created quite a stir in 1994 when an eighteen-year-old U.S.
citizen, Michael Fay, was sentenced to be "caned" in punishment for
his acts of vandalism and graffiti in Singapore.261 President Clinton
and thirty-four U.S. senators appealed to the Singapore government
for clemency on Mr. Fay's behalf.62 Many U.S. citizens were also out-
raged by what they called "draconian" and "barbarous" punish-
ment.2"
Whipping was certainly not considered cruel and unusual pun-
ishment when the framers of our Constitution wrote the original Bill
of Rights.2" Even as late as 1963, the Supreme Court of Delaware
ruled that whipping prisoners for certain crimes, as required by a
256. Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
257. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). For a fascinating history of
cruel and unusual punishment and its prohibition from common law to modern times,
see Justice Marshall's exposition in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314-33 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
258. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
259. Furman, 408 U.S. at 329 (Marshall, J., concurring).
260. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (rejecting the use of the
strap on prisoners as a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
261. See, e.g., Not Sparing the Rod; How Cruel, How Unusual?, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 10, 1994, at 69.
262. Id.
263. Flogging in Singapore, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1994, at B6. Note also that many
U.S. citizens also applauded Singapore's punishment of Mr. Fay. Id.
264. In deliberation over the language of the Amendments, Mr. Livermore of New
Hampshire stated "villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut
off; but are we to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are
cruel?" 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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Delaware statute, did not violate either the Delaware Constitution,
nor the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitu-
tion."5 But the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are
incompatible with "evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society.""' So today, both whipping and denial of
medical care are now unconstitutional.
As medical researchers have nearly obviated the need for physi-
cal suffering from medical conditions, will not all refusals to treat the
pain of prisoners eventually be considered an "unnecessary and wan-
ton infliction of pain?" The Eighth Amendment's protections have ex-
panded to mirror our nation's sense of decency and concern for suffer-
ing. The elasticity of the Eighth Amendment need not be tested fur-
ther, as the current medical standard dovetails neatly with the cur-
rent law to adequately protect prisoners. Applying the evolving medi-
cal standard of care to the existing legal standard should lead courts
to characterize every failure to ameliorate a prisoner's pain due to a
serious medical condition, as "deliberate indifference" to suffering,
which is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
It is clear from a review of the medical literature that pain can
be aggressively treated and successfully ameliorated with the arsenal
of medicines and treatments available. As the views of Professors
Rich and Furrow, as well as other legal scholars, are adopted and
pursued in the courts to make the undertreatment of pain not only
medically unethical, but legally actionable, the public will no longer
tolerate unnecessary suffering based on outdated social mores and
cultural assumptions. This lowered tolerance for pain among the
general population will also demand a new "civilized minimum" for
our nation's prisoners.
After the Estelle ruling, many legal commentators were con-
cerned that the standard of "deliberate indifference" was largely un-
workable, making it impossible to secure adequate protection for
prisoners against cruel and unusual punishment. Other critics of the
Estelle decision claimed that the Supreme Court reached beyond the
scope of the Eighth Amendment, and that a failure to provide medi-
cal treatment to prisoners should never be considered punishment at
all. They believed that failure to treat pain was not the same as in-
flicting pain, and could therefore not be considered punishment.
Estelle held that the fact that a prison official did not directly inflict a
prisoner's pain does not make that official any less culpable for fail-
265. Delaware v. Cannon, 55 Del. 587, 597 (1963). The court noted that in Great
Britain, whipping was in use until 1948, and in Canada until 1957. Id. at 596. The
court also noted that Delaware had abolished the punishment of pillory only in 1905.
Id. at 593. Pillory is "[a] wooden framework with holes through which an offender's
head and hands are placed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1168 (7th ed. 1999).
266. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
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ure to properly treat that pain.267 The Estelle standard placed the bar
of proving an Eighth Amendment violation rather high, requiring a
prisoner to prove an element of intent.26 Farmer clarified the delib-
erate indifference standard,269 and again spurred legal commentary
concerning what constituted a breach of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, but kept the bar
rather high, permitting claims only in fairly egregious circumstances.
Recent advances in medicine have lowered the standard for accept-
able pain, and with it, the amount of suffering that should trigger a
finding of deliberate indifference.
The Seventh Circuit's approach to weighing the costs of treat-
ment against the potential harm of failure to treat27 ° should be re-
vised to incorporate the costs of potential legal action and the dimin-
ished healing abilities of a suffering prisoner. Courts and prison offi-
cials alike may then conclude that withholding adequate pain medi-
cation is not only cruel and unusual punishment, but may also be
economically short sighted.
Lawyers who help prisoners with securing humane medical
treatment for their suffering must embrace the modern medical
standards of effective pain management in fashioning their claims
for relief or for damages against state actors who deny effective pain
amelioration. Especially in claims of drug substitution, or failure to
provide adequate amounts or timely delivery of pain medication, it is
essential that practitioners and pro se litigants feature the reality of
medicine's ability to ameliorate suffering in their pleas to the courts.
In future claims of cruel and unusual punishment for failure to
adequately treat pain, a prisoner or his lawyer should incorporate
the mounting evidence available in the medical literature revealing
medicine's true capacity for alleviation of suffering. Recognition of
the fact that almost all pain is treatable, makes substituting inferior
drugs or the denial of prescribed medication for a prisoner's pain tan-
tamount to a choice to deliberately inflict suffering. When the reality
of the principles of modern pain management are considered, the ex-
isting legal standard for litigating Eighth Amendment claims is ade-
267. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). The line of reasoning that ar-
gues that a jailer is not inflicting punishment on prisoners by denying them medical
treatment reminds me of a child wildly thrashing his fists in a windmill fashion, ad-
vancing upon his victim, saying "I am just walking towards you, swinging my fists, if
you happen to be in the way it is your own fault." The prisoner obviously has no other
recourse to end his suffering.
268. Id. at 105-06 (stating that not every claim of inadequate treatment is a viola-
tion of the Eight Amendment; for example, where this is an accident or inadvertent
failure, or malpractice).
269. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-45 (1994) (holding that deliberate indif-
ference requires recklessness, as measured under a subjective test).
270. Ralston v. McGovern, 167 F.3d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1999).
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quate to provide a valid claim for relief to prisoners who are denied
appropriate pain amelioration for serious medical conditions.
